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Abstract
This inquiry seeks to establish the degree to which economic stimulus measures impact
COVID-19 mortality rates. There appears to be an inverse correlation between domestic social
spending and COVID-19 deaths. While confirmed infections are the most reliable predictor of
mortality rates, trust in government is an important factor to consider when public compliance
with health directives determines the degree of epidemiological risk in each country. Although
most economists agree that stimulus monies directed to low-income individuals to prevent
financial collapse were appropriate, there is some dissention with regard to the type and size of
such cash infusions. Nonetheless, behavioral economists believe that any such payments ought
to be large enough to incentivize compliance with lockdown and other containment measures.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a historic event that will doubtless be analyzed from every angle;
this inquiry seeks to contribute to that growing body of literature in hopes of guiding
policymakers in achieving optimal outcomes through governmental spending measures in
future emergencies.
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1.

INTRODUCTION:
This inquiry seeks to establish the degree to which economic stimulus measures impact

COVID-19 death rates after controlling for cultural values such as in-group collectivism and
trust in government, as well as each country’s policies to contain the spread of the novel
coronavirus, total COVID-19 infections per million population, and development in terms of
quality of life and access to education and healthcare. I will begin by providing a background of
the spread of COVID-19 and the rise in governmental measures to prevent infections, followed
by a review of factors that improve and inhibit compliance with contagion-limiting practices,
and the efficacy of governmental responses. Then I will describe the dependent and
independent variables under consideration in this research, the econometric model utilized, and
my results and conclusions. This inquiry seeks to contribute to a growing body of literature
related to economic shocks and unanticipated disruptions to human activities which may guide
policymakers in achieving optimal outcomes through governmental spending measures in
future emergencies.
2.

BACKGROUND:
COVID-19 is the illness that results from the novel coronavirus that emerged from the

Wuhan region of China in late 2019 (Li et al., 2020; Rothan & Byrareddy, 2020; Ciotti et al.,
2020). COVID-19 presents with an array of symptoms and varying severity, but typical cases
involve respiratory difficulties, neurological symptoms such as loss of taste or smell, digestive
issues, body aches, and fever. Some cases are asymptomatic, while others become lifethreatening (p. 2, Rothan & Byrareddy, 2020). The novel coronavirus is highly contagious, and
rapidly spread from China to 20 other countries (South Korea, the United States, Macau,
Singapore, Malaysia, Nepal, Vietnam, France, Australia, Canada, Cambodia, Sri Lanka,
Germany, United Arab Emirates, Finland, India, the Philippines, Russia, Italy, and the United
Kingdom) by the end of January 2020 (Kantis et al., 2020).
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On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the novel coronavirus a
public health emergency at the second meeting of the International Health Regulations
Emergency Committee. As COVID-19 infections surged to over 80,000 globally and the death
toll surpassed 3,000, governments around the world began issuing lockdown orders, travel
bans, and a moratorium on large gatherings in February 2020. On March 11, 2020, the United
Nations announced that one in five schoolchildren were no longer able to attend in-person
classes due to the pandemic. By March 25, 2020, “[n]early one third of the world’s population
[was] affected by coronavirus lockdowns” (Kantis et al., 2020). The World Health Organization
(2020) initially recommended that individuals wash their hands frequently, cover their mouth
when they sneezed, and sanitize surfaces often (p. 3). In early April 2020, scientists confirmed
that most person-to-person transmissions of the novel coronavirus occurred through airborne
droplets, leading to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s recommendation that all
members of the public wear fabric face masks when social distancing of at least 6 feet cannot be
maintained or when in enclosed spaces with people who are not members of one’s household
(Fisher et al., 2020). In August 2020, the World Health Organization and International
Monetary Fund reported that the pandemic cost the global economy over $375 billion per
month (Kantis et al., 2020). While the decision to stop international travel, ban large public
gatherings, close schools, and enter lockdown varied in timing depending upon each country’s
infection rates, the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are undeniable and vast.
3.

LITERATURE REVIEW:
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, numerous academic treatises have been

written with regard to the impact of contagion-limiting policy and their ensuing economic
impacts. These inquiries can be categorized into analyses of fiscal policy and studies of
containment policies to limit the spread of COVID-19 and public compliance thereunder.
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3.1

FISCAL POLICY
The vast majority of economists endorse providing fiscal support for businesses and

individuals during the COVID-19 pandemic (Agarwal et al., 2020; Alfaro et al., 2020; Ashraf,
2020a; Barrios et al., 2021; Brodeur et al., 2020; Carlsson-Szlezak et al., 2020a; CarlssonSzlezak et al., 2020b; Chang & Velasco, 2020; Eichenbaum, Rebelo, & Trabandt, 2020; Elgin,
Basbug, & Yalaman, 2020; Lou, Shen & Niemeier, 2020; Rho, Brown & Fremstad, 2020; Sieroń,
2020; Soofi, Najafi, & Karami-Matin, 2020; Wright et al., 2020). As the pandemic forced
business closures and a shift to virtual work in many industries, the risk of hunger and
homelessness increased. Many governments responded to this sudden growth in economic
instability by providing expanded unemployment benefits, direct cash stimulus to needy
families, and subsidies to businesses to retain workers on their payrolls whilst unable to operate.
The studies detailed below track the impact of COVID-19 containment measures on the
economy, how to protect vulnerable populations from economic collapse, and how government
policy responses may impact economic recovery once the COVID-19 pandemic is under control.
The impact of COVID-19 containment measures on the economy at large are quite
significant. Brodeur et al. (2020) summarize Carlsson-Szlezak et al. (2020a) and CarlssonSzlezak et al.’s (2020b) research and state there are three ways that COVID-19 will impact the
economy:
The first is the direct impact, which is related to the reduced consumption of
goods and services. Prolonged lengths of the pandemic and the social distancing
measures might reduce consumer confidence by keeping consumers at home,
wary of discretionary spending and pessimistic about the long-term economic
prospects. The second one is the indirect impact working through financial
market shocks and their effects on the real economy. Household wealth will likely
fall, savings will increase, and consumption spending will decrease further. The
third consists of supply-side disruptions; as COVID-19 keeps production halted,
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it will negatively impact supply chains, labor demand, and employment, leading
to prolonged periods of lay-offs and rising unemployment. (p. 18)
These impacts can be seen through firm layoffs, decreased consumer borrowing, reduced stock
market returns, and shortages of goods. Makin & Layton (2021) find that these changes in
consumer and business behavior lead to a “sharp 2020 budget deficit spike” (p. 343) due to
diminished income, sales, and value-added tax volume, in addition to increased social support
spending. They question the wisdom of increased budget deficits and federal borrowing
following the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, since governments will largely be accepting a debt
burden for additional social welfare benefits without any tangible corresponding addition to
government balance sheets. Further, Makin & Layton (2021) state that granting cash support to
low-income people during the pandemic is contrary to stay-at-home policies, and may be saved
rather than spent due to economic uncertainty (p. 347). However, while a significant amount of
economic activity shifted online as the pandemic grew in severity and lockdown measures were
implemented, the prevailing perspective of economists is that means-tested cash bailouts to
individuals and families are unlikely to loiter in low-income people’s bank accounts when the
degree of economic fallout from the COVID-19 crisis is so severe. Feeding America (Morello,
2021) states that 40% of the people served by food banks in the United States during the period
March through October 2020 were receiving food assistance for the first time, and more than
80% of food banks encountered increased demand year-over-year. When food insecurity is at
record levels in developed countries, cash infusions to underprivileged individuals appear not
only to be the humane response, but also represent a relatively inexpensive alternative to
outright economic collapse for the most vulnerable.
Fiscal stimulus packages allow governments to respond to the COVID-19 crisis and
ameliorate some of the losses and instability that disadvantaged communities experience due to
the pandemic. Lou, Shen & Niemeier (2020) argue “[o]ne possible mitigation measure is
prioritizing financial, health care and economic support for the vulnerable groups, especially for
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essential workers” (p. 17). These measures not only may stave off hunger and homelessness for
low-income people, but also encourage compliance with COVID-19 public health
recommendations. Chang & Velasco (2020) determined that while all countries should seek to
perform COVID-19 testing at as great a scale as possible, if policymakers intend to provide fiscal
stimulus monies to induce workers to stay at home, the size of the stimulus measures should
increase alongside the rate of testing since individuals will anticipate lower risks from returning
to work if testing rates are higher (p. 17). Further, Soofi, Najafi, & Karami-Matin (2020) argue
that fiscal measures are an opportunity to improve the reward for compliance with public health
directives, and have been shown to boost “adherence to antiretroviral medication, smoking
cessation, and weight loss, and […] to be effective in changing behaviors” (citations omitted) (p.
346). Thus, fiscal measures address not just the economic consequences of COVID-19, but also
limit its spread and severity, leading to multiplicative policy benefits.
Financial markets also experienced volatility as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ashraf (2020a) utilized daily stock market return data during the first several months of the
COVID-19 pandemic to determine financial markets’ responses to infection rates, lockdown
orders, and economic stimulus packages. This study found that lockdown and social distancing
orders had direct negative effects and indirect positive effects on stock market returns (due to
reduced business activities and reduced infection rates respectively), but that income support
packages led to improved financial market performance. Ashraf’s conclusions lend credence to
the underlying theory of this analysis that economic stimulus packages incentivize social
distancing and contagion-limiting behavior, leading to lower infection rates among countries
that implement robust income support packages.
Recovery from the COVID-19 crisis is dependent upon the population becoming
immunized (either through vaccination or herd immunity), and a return to at least the previous
level of economic activities. However, Carlsson-Szlezak, Reeves & Swartz (2020b) find that
while all previous pandemics caused V-shaped economic shocks, where there is a steep decline
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in output followed by a sharp recovery, the COVID-19 pandemic may not follow this trend due to
the extraordinary lockdown measures imposed to control the spread of the virus. Makin &
Layton (2021) detail these vast economic effects as both an aggregate demand shock and
aggregate supply shock due to supply chain breakdowns, closure of non-essential workplaces,
loss of employment income to individuals and families, and increased uncertainty across the
board (p. 340). As a result, more robust policy responses are recommended to address the
extreme economic impact of COVID-19. “[Céspedes, Chang & Velasco (2020)] argue the
optimal policy response is to combine loosening of monetary policy with enhanced social
insurance. In contrast, unconventional policies such as wage subsidies, helicopter drops of
liquid assets, equity injections, and loan guarantees can keep the economy in a full employment,
high-productivity equilibrium” (p. 44, Brodeur et al., 2020). Clearly, government fiscal policy is
at risk of not being aggressive enough, rather than providing too much support and experiencing
dead-weight loss.
3.2

COVID-19 CONTAINMENT POLICIES AND PUBLIC COMPLIANCE
While the financial impact of COVID-19 containment policies cannot be overstated, the

impact and efficacy of containment policies are also a key object of study in the emerging body
of academic literature. As El Zowalatya & Järhultc (2020) succinctly state, “Coronaviruses
represent a continuous pandemic threat; humans have experienced two coronavirus-related
health security crises since 2003” (p. 1). As a result, government responses, albeit clearly
deleterious economically, appear measured and necessary in the context of the highly
transmissible and potentially fatal novel coronavirus. According to John Hopkins University
(2020), containment measures consisting of social distancing, the closure of businesses, schools,
churches and public gathering places are intended to “[flatten] the curve [by] reducing the
number of new COVID-19 cases from one day to the next. This helps prevent healthcare systems
from becoming overwhelmed.” Especially at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, medical
experts acknowledged the impossibility of eliminating the disease without an effective vaccine,
6

so limiting stress on healthcare systems became the primary object of concern. Unfortunately,
some of these measures may have been more stringent than necessary. Agarwal et al. (2020),
state that after a 40% decrease in mobility, “lifting severe mobility restrictions and only
retaining moderate mobility restrictions (at retail and transit locations), seems to effectively
flatten the curve” (emphasis in original) (p. 1). The diminishing effectiveness of decreasing
human movements on limiting mortality rates may be a result of sufficiently flattening the curve
to ensure hospital availability for COVID-19 infections that require intensive care. Nonetheless,
some people may feel disheartened to recognize that a 40% decrease in mobility may have
sufficient to optimally minimize COVID-19 deaths. El Zowalatya & Järhultc (2020) emphasize
that “a mixture of measures is important [to decrease human-to-human transmission] from
strictly medical (transmission routes, efficiency of PPE, vaccines, antivirals and so on) to more
social science-oriented (How do people behave when they suspect they could be infected? How
do they behave when they are sick? How to potentially change these behaviours?)” (p. 6). While
social distancing, travel bans and lockdown measures were appropriate from an epidemiological
perspective, human behavior is not so simple or open to change regardless of public health
recommendations.
A variety of factors appear to influence to what degree people comply with public health
advisories to limit transmission of COVID-19. Wright et al. (2020) determined that poverty and
economic dislocation related to or worsened by COVID-19 lockdown measures inhibit
compliance with social distancing and shelter-in-place orders. Essential workers usually qualify
as low income and/or perform services in environments that require interactions with scores of
members of the public, such as pharmacies, grocery stores, healthcare, convenience stores,
warehouses, public transit, and childcare (Rho, Brown & Fremstad, 2020). Karaye & Horney
(2020) tested whether a social vulnerability index (compiled by the CDC and including
measurements for socioeconomic status, household composition, disability, minority status,
language spoken, and access to transportation) impacted COVID-19 infections per 100,000
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population, and found that the social vulnerability index overall, and all factors other than
socioeconomic status, were statistically significant and positively correlated with increased
COVID-19 infections (pp. 318-319). Meanwhile, Lou, Shen & Niemeier (2020) determined that
lower income individuals are “less likely to (be able) to follow the order to stay at home,
controlling for other factors” (p. 16). As a result, it is reasonable to expect low-income
individuals and their families to bear the brunt of the pandemic.
Barrios et al. (2021) utilize location data from cellular phones and data from surveys to
conclusively determine that there is a link between regions with high levels of civic capital and
voluntary compliance with social distancing measures, noting that “in the absence of any
punishment, an infected individual derives no personal benefit from complying with public
health recommendations, despite the potentially large social benefits” (p. 2). Similarly, Ashraf
(2020b) reviewed 43 countries’ uncertainty avoidance and COVID-19 confirmed infections in
relation to stock market returns, theorizing that countries with higher uncertainty avoidance
would panic-sell at higher rates in response to increased COVID-19 infections, even after taking
significant losses in the stock market (pp. 3-4). The model confirmed this hypothesis and
determined that cultural values are a significant factor in determining stock markets’ responses
to the COVID-19 pandemic. In accordance with Rousseau’s (2016) famed stag hunt parable of
game theory, individuals will only cooperate with one another for a higher payoff if they expect
the other player to cooperate. If individuals are dubious of others’ compliance with social
distancing, hand washing, or mask-wearing protocols, they may determine that there is a higher
return for non-compliance themselves and choose not to cooperate with the socially
advantageous public health recommendations. Similarly, Brodeur et al. (2020) cite a study by
Eichenbaum, Rebelo, & Trabandt (2020) that emphasizes that “the competitive equilibrium is
not Pareto optimal, as agents do not consider that their actions impact the infection and death
rates of other economic agents. To properly internalize the externality, the authors suggest that
the containment measures are optimal if they are tightened over time in proportion to the
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spread of infection” (p. 24). This, combined with Soofi, Najafi, & Karami-Matin’s (2020) finding
that individuals believe they are less likely to catch the novel coronavirus than their peers, “even
if their peers adhere to preventive practices” (p. 347), indicates that humans are poor judges of
risky behaviors. As a result, people cannot be expected to comply with public health orders out
of altruism or self-interest. In contrast, Alfaro, et al. (2020) found that “preference traits, such
as patience, altruism, and trust, as well as community traits, such as reciprocity, matter for the
behavioral response of individuals during a pandemic” (p. 41). Soofi, Najafi, & Karami-Matin
(2020) recommend framing health-protective behaviors in terms of gains to the individual,
“such as ‘If you wash your hands properly/follow social distancing policy/adhere to the stay-athome policy, you will increase the chances of yourself and your family having a long, healthy
life’” (p. 347), and “draw[ing] attention to what other people are doing” (p. 348). Through these
simple changes in public service announcements, epidemiologists and healthcare professionals
may utilize the wisdom of behavioral economics to maximize behavior change and minimize
COVID-19 transmissions.
Given that individuals will only comply when they expect others to also comply with
contagion-limiting protocols and otherwise default to status quo behavior, regions with higher
civic capital (and thus higher rates of compliance) generate self-reinforcing effects that lead to
fewer infections in certain regions. In order to account for these factors in this model, I will
consider trust in government and in-group collectivism practices to control for regional
differences in civic capital and its impacts on COVID-19 mortality rates.
4.

METHODOLOGY:
This research depends upon an ordinary least squares regression that measures a

combined value of government domestic social spending and COVID-19 fiscal measures
distributed to individuals and healthcare systems, COVID-19 infections per million population, a
trust in government index, an in-group collectivism values index, a human development index,
and a containment and health index’s impact upon COVID-19 mortality rates. The regression is
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run traditionally and using the robust function to account for any heteroskedasticity with nearly
identical results (see Table 1). The origins of the data and the transformations performed upon
them are described in more detail below.
4.1

DATA SOURCES

4.1.1 FISCAL MEASURES AND COVID-19 INFECTION AND MORTALITY DATA
The fiscal measures were determined utilizing data provided by the University of Oxford,
Blatvatnik School of Government’s “Coronavirus Government Response Tracker” (Hale, et al.,
2021) which included the total amount of fiscal measures provided to individuals and healthcare
systems in 2020 U.S. dollars from the beginning of the pandemic through January 17, 2021.
Using measurements of GDP per capita and current population for each country provided by
Our World in Data, the emergency domestic fiscal measures provided to individuals and
healthcare systems were calculated as a percentage of each country’s GDP. This was combined
with the OECD’s social spending data as a percent of GDP as of 2017 in order to generate an
approximation of each country’s domestic social spending as a percent of GDP after the onset of
the COVID-19 crisis. This aligns with OECD (2020) predictions that the “COVID-19 pandemic
of 2020 is expected to lead to a marked increase in social spending” (p. 2). As a result, the
combined value of 2017 domestic social spending, fiscal measures, and emergency healthcare
funding as a percentage of GDP is intended to approximate the OECD’s social spending
indicator for 2020 until these figures become available. Meanwhile, COVID-19 infection and
mortality rates are measured at a rate of per million population to account for variation in
population size across the 27 countries evaluated. Next, I will discuss the various indexes
utilized to control for variation in culture and government responsiveness in terms of lockdown
and social distancing measures.
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4.1.2 INDEXES FOR CULTURAL VALUES AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC
In this research, a variety of indexes are used to control for cultural variation and
asymmetrical responsiveness to the COVID-19 crisis, including the OECD’s trust in government
indicator, the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness’ 2004 Culture,
Leadership, and Organizations study’s in-group collectivism practices index, the United Nations
Development Programme’s human development index, and the University of Oxford’s
COVID-19 containment and health index. The OECD’s trust in government indicator is on a
scale of 1 to 100 and evaluates the share of survey respondents over a three-year period who
responded “‘yes’ […] to the survey question: ‘In this country, do you have confidence in …
national government?’” (OECD). The GLOBE study includes indices for a number of cultural
values and practices, including the in-group collectivism practices index which measures “the
degree to which members in a culture express pride, loyalty, and interdependence in their
families. […] It is associated with pride in affiliation and a general affective commitment toward
family, group, community, and nation” (Gupta & Kirwan, 2013). Because the in-group
collectivism practices index was determined on a seven-point scale while all other indexes in this
research were on a scale of 1 to 100, the GLOBE scores for each country were divided by seven
and multiplied by 100 to ensure uniformity in the model. In addition, the in-group collectivism
practices index scores for East Germany and West Germany were combined proportional to the
percent of population present in each region as of 2004 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017). The
United Nations Development Programme’s human development index provides a “summary
measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy
life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living” (Roser et al., 2020). Finally, the
University of Oxford’s containment and health index aggregates 13 measures including school
and workplace closures, the cancellation of public events, restrictions on gatherings, public
transit closure, stay at home requirements, restrictions on internal movements, international
travel controls, public information campaigns, testing policies, contact tracing, facial covering

11

policies, and vaccination policies. Each of these closure, containment and health measures are
determined on an ordinal scale from “no policy in place” to the most stringent policy possible.
The index is then calculated by dividing each country’s daily score for each measure listed above
by the maximum ordinal value of that measurement, multiplied by 100 and averaged to generate
a number between 1 and 100 (pp. 27-28, Hale et al., 2020).
4.2

RESULTS
Table 1
COVID-19 Deaths per Million Population

Independent Variables

Traditional OLS

COVID-19 Infections per Million Population

0.014

0.014

(5.83) **

(6.46) **

12.143

Trust in Government Index

(2.23) *

Domestic Social Spending, Fiscal Measures and
Additional Healthcare Spending as a Percent of GDP

Robust OLS

-12.143
(2.57) *

-39.901

-39.901

(0.08)

(0.09)

-3.911

-3.911

(0.55)

(0.72)

-14.519

-14.519

(0.89)

(1.01)

-3.574

-3.574

(0.68)

(0.75)

2,542.737

2,542.737

(1.47)

(1.55)

R2

0.733

0.733

N

27

27

In-Group Collectivism Practices Index
Human Development Index
COVID-19 Containment and Health Index
Constant

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; parentheses indicate t-test values

Complete regression outputs are available in Appendix B.
Based upon this model, the baseline number of COVID-19 deaths is approximately 2,500
per million population, which increases with infections per million population, and decreases
with the in-group collectivism practices index, the human development index, the containment
and health index, and the sum of social spending, fiscal measures, and additional healthcare
spending per million population. While Our World in Data (Roser et al., 2020) indicates a
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mean case fatality rate of about 2.1% (COVID-19 infections per million resulting in COVID-19
deaths per million population) in the 23 countries included in this analysis, the model
determines there is a 1.4% confirmed case fatality rate, demonstrating an overrepresentation of
wealthy countries with advanced healthcare systems in this dataset or that some portion of the
COVID-19 mortality rate is absorbed by the other explanatory variables in the model.
This model accounts for 73.3% of the variation in COVID-19 deaths per million
population, although only the infections per million population and trust in government were
statistically significant at a 1% and 5% level, respectively. While the majority of the independent
variables in this model are not statistically significant, the relatively high R 2 value and the
intuitive signs of the coefficients indicate that the in-group collectivism practices index, the
human development index, the containment and health index, and the combined value of
domestic social spending, fiscal measures, and additional healthcare spending are correlated
with fewer COVID-19 deaths, even if the null hypothesis that these variables have no impact on
COVID-19 cannot be empirically rejected.
It is unsurprising that fiscal measures intended to restore economic activity and rescue
impoverished families during the COVID-19 pandemic were not a statistically significant
predictor of COVID-19 deaths. While fewer deaths are correlated with more domestic social
spending and fiscal measures, Brodeur et al. (2020) reviewed a study from Elgin, Basbug &
Yalaman (2020) which found that a COVID-19 “‘Stringency Index’ [was] a not a significant
predictor of economic stimulus, which suggests that public health measures do not drive
economic stimulus measures” (p. 38). A stronger correlation may have been evident if
governments responded to increased infections and deaths with higher fiscal allotments, but
such a response may not have been economically advisable. While it is important for
policymakers to ensure that fiscal stimulus measures are sufficient to encourage contagionlimiting behavior (id., p. 43), stimulus measures were primarily directed toward rescuing lowincome families from economic collapse and financial ruin. In fact, stimulus measures were
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primarily distributed in hopes of dispelling the risks of a domestic and global financial crisis,
especially with the specter of the Great Recession so recent in many economists’ and
policymakers’ memories. As observed in 2008, an economic crisis may have global impacts on
financial markets due to the interconnected nature of the modern global economy (Helleiner,
2011).
Perhaps more unexpected is the meager impact of containment and health restrictions
on COVID-19 mortality rates. The containment and health restrictions measured by the
University of Oxford’s “Coronavirus Government Response Tracker” (Hale, et al., 2021) may be
negatively correlated at a statistically insignificant level due to a time lag in some countries
adopting restrictions on commerce, travel, and non-essential social interactions, or due to the
inherent flaws in measuring government policy on an ordinal scale to generate an index for the
restrictiveness of various countries’ response to the pandemic. If the issue lies in the former
possibility, a time series dataset may have different results from those found herein. The final
alternative is that as our knowledge and understanding of how COVID-19 spreads from personto-person improves, containment and health policy responses may become more effectual and
accurate in targeting high-risk activities. As it stands, the “closest analogy [to the current
contagion-limiting approach] is to government command and control of economies in wartime,
in this case with the virus as the foreign invader” (p. 340, Makin & Layton, 2021). Some
measures to control spread of the virus have been criticized as draconian, and while the costs of
lockdown measures are certainly quite high (as high as “$7 trillion per year of shutdown” in the
United States alone [p. 2, Mulligan, 2020]), Sieroń (2020) explains that “COVID-19 is an
infectious disease, which means that the risk is multiplicative. It implies that actions that seem
irrational or exaggerated at an individual level are precisely the actions we need from the
systemic point of view” (p. 5). Nonetheless, it is disheartening to question whether the impact of
these containment measures was as substantial as policymakers hoped.
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Finally, while primarily included in this model in order to control for anticipated
variation across OECD countries, the negative correlation between COVID-19 deaths and ingroup collectivism practices, trust in government, and the human development index align with
expectations that greater pride in country, confidence in government communiques, and access
to quality healthcare would improve COVID-19 infection rates and mortality rates.
4.3

ROBUSTNESS AND LIMITATIONS
The ordinary least squares regressions in this analysis meet the seven assumptions of

econometric regression modeling as demonstrated by the graphs and summary statistics in
Appendix B. The relationships are more or less linear based upon the kernel-weighted local
polynomial regression performed upon each of the independent variables. The variance
inflation factor scores indicate multicollinearity is not an issue in these models. The mean of the
error terms is very nearly zero (-0.00000126). The independent variables are not correlated
with residuals and there is no pattern to the distribution that would indicate heteroskedasticity
(see Residuals vs. Fitted Values graph on page 26). There is no serial correlation in the models
since the data are cross-sectional. No independent variable is perfectly correlated with any
other variable (see Correlation Matrix on page 26). Finally, the error term is normally
distributed (see Density vs. Residuals graph on page 25). As a result, while the model is largely
not statistically significant, ordinary least squares regressions appear to be appropriate in the
context of this analysis.
4.4

FURTHER RESEARCH
Because the models utilized herein were not as conclusive as hoped, there are a number

of directions that future research may take in order to more effectively determine the
relationship between COVID-19 fiscal measures and mortality rates. Time series data for a
larger grouping of countries may be useful to more accurately reflect containment measures and
fiscal stimulus measures’ impact on mortality rates, given that there is a time delay between
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cash infusions and alteration of consumer activity (p. 41, Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009) and that
some countries enacted containment measures more rapidly in response to confirmed infections
than others. Further, a difference-in-differences approach may be useful to contrast excess
deaths and COVID-19 fiscal stimulus measures with pre-pandemic norms. Additionally,
generating a categorical variable that divides each countries’ residents into low-income, middleincome, and high-income tiers and reflects the infection and mortality rates for each group may
allow the impact of fiscal measures (which primarily were distributed to low-income
individuals) to be more apparent. Finally, once the OECD’s social spending indicator for 2020 is
available, it may be worthwhile to repeat the regressions herein in order to determine the degree
of accuracy achieved by combining emergency COVID-19 healthcare spending, stimulus
measures to individuals, and the 2017 social spending indicator to determine domestic welfare
budgeting during the COVID-19 crisis.
5.

CONCLUSION:
This inquiry sought to establish the degree to which economic stimulus measures impact

COVID-19 mortality rates. While the results herein are not as conclusive as hoped, there does
appear to be an inverse correlation between domestic social spending and COVID-19 deaths.
Further, while confirmed infections are the most reliable predictor of mortality rates, trust in
government is an important factor to consider when public compliance with health directives
determines the degree of epidemiological risk in each country. Although most economists agree
that stimulus monies directed to low-income individuals to prevent financial collapse were
appropriate, there is some dissention with regard to the type and size of such cash infusions.
Nonetheless, behavioral economists believe that any such payments ought to be large enough to
incentivize compliance with lockdown and other containment measures. The COVID-19
pandemic is a historic event that will doubtless be analyzed from every angle; this inquiry seeks
to contribute to that growing body of literature in hopes of guiding policymakers in achieving
optimal outcomes through governmental spending measures in future emergencies.
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